Motive-based enforcement

Wim Voermans

doi:10.20499/2236-3645.RJP2014v16e108-39

Autores Convidados

v. 16 n. 108 (2014)

Motive-based enforcement

Wim Voermans^▸^▾

PDF (English)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.20499/2236-3645.RJP2014v16e108-39
Enviado: 5 fevereiro 2015
Publicado: 30-05-2014

Resumo

What can public authorities do in order to promote regulatory compliance?
This paper argues that understanding the compliance motives is key to any enforcement strategy. Simply stepping up the enforcement effort or stiffening
penalties is – most of the time – quite ineffective. Especially attempts at engineering
criminal law rules to achieve a heightened deterrence effects will generally be
ineffective, social science research suggests. And – much in the same vein – raising administrative enforcement efforts does not automatically raise compliance rates proportionally. There is not a one-on-one relation between enforcement effort and compliance outcome, although this idea seems to be underpinning a lot of presentday enforcement strategies. Enforcement efforts are but one of the many norm-support cues to comply. Recent research rather suggests that a sort of bandwagon-effect exists as regards regulatory compliance. Compliant behaviour, or enforcement activities that reminds us of (or merely point out) the existence of a norm, prompt (more) compliant behaviour. Designers of enforcement strategies need to keep this in mind.

Referências

AYRES, I.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
BEETHAM, David. The Legitimation of Power. Palgrave MacMillan, 1991, p. 69-70 and p. 91.
CHECKEL, Jeffrey T. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, International Organization, Massachusetts, v. 55, n. 3, p. 555–557, 2001.
ELFFERS, Henk; HESSING, Dick J. Hessing. Het nut van sanctions (The Usefulness of Sanctions). Ars Aequi (Dutch Student Law Magazine), 1997, 46, p. 490-496.
EIJLANDER, P.;VOERMANS, W. Wetgevingsleer. Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague, 2000.
FULLER, Lon L. Human Interaction and the Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Oxford, v. 14, n. 1, p. 24, 1969.
GUNNINGHAM, N.; GRABOSKY, P.; SINCLAIR, D. Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
KEIZER, Kees. The Spreading of Disorder, PhD-thesis. Groningen: University of Groningen, 2010, p. 90.
LEVI, Margaret; SACKS, Audrey. Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators. Regulation & Governance, 2009, v. 3, n. 4, p. 311-333.
RAUSTIALA, Kal; SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. International Law, International Relations and Compliance. In: CARLNAES, W.; RISSE, T.; SIMMONS, B.A. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, 2002, p. 540.
REMKES, J. W. Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Dutch House of Representatives, dated 6 November 2006, offer of evaluation of action programme “Quality Enforcement”. Available at: http://www.justitie.nl/images/evaluatie%20Handhaven%20op%20Niveau_6534_tcm34-25550.pdf
ROBINSON, Paul H.; DARLEY, John M. Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, v. 42, n. 2.
SANDERSON, Catherine A.; DARLEY, John M. Darley. I Am Moral, but You Are Deterred: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law. Journal of Applied Psychology, 2002, v. 32, n. 2, p. 375-405.
SCHOLZ, J. Deterrence, cooperation and the ecology of regulatory enforcement. Law and Society Review. Utah: Wiley, 1984, v. 18, n. 2, p. 179-224.
STURMAN, Henry. Zwaarder straffen werkt. Elsevier, 17 January 2003. Available at: http://www.henrysturman.com/dutch/artikelen/straffen.html
TALLBERG, Jonas. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union. International Organization. Massachusetts, v. 56, p. 609-643, 2002
TYLER, Tom R. Why do People Obey the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
VAN VELTHOVEN, B. C.J. Economie van misdaad en straf (The Economy of Crime and Punishment). Boom Lemma Publishers, 2012.
VERSLUIS, Esther. Compliance Problems in the EU: What potential role for agencies in securing compliance, Paper prepared for the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest 2005. Available at: http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/eversluis.pdf Visited on 4 Feb. 2013.
WITTBERG, Lennart. Can Communication Activities Improve Compliance? In: ELFFERS, H.; VERBOON, P.; HUISMAN, W. (ed.). Managing and Maintaining Compliance. Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague 2006, p. 25-43.

Declaração de Direito Autoral

[1] AYRES, I.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

[2] BEETHAM, David. The Legitimation of Power. Palgrave MacMillan, 1991, p. 69-70 and p. 91.

[3] CHECKEL, Jeffrey T. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, International Organization, Massachusetts, v. 55, n. 3, p. 555–557, 2001.

[4] ELFFERS, Henk; HESSING, Dick J. Hessing. Het nut van sanctions (The Usefulness of Sanctions). Ars Aequi (Dutch Student Law Magazine), 1997, 46, p. 490-496.

[5] EIJLANDER, P.;VOERMANS, W. Wetgevingsleer. Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague, 2000.

[6] FULLER, Lon L. Human Interaction and the Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Oxford, v. 14, n. 1, p. 24, 1969.

[7] GUNNINGHAM, N.; GRABOSKY, P.; SINCLAIR, D. Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

[8] KEIZER, Kees. The Spreading of Disorder, PhD-thesis. Groningen: University of Groningen, 2010, p. 90.

[9] LEVI, Margaret; SACKS, Audrey. Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators. Regulation & Governance, 2009, v. 3, n. 4, p. 311-333.

[10] RAUSTIALA, Kal; SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. International Law, International Relations and Compliance. In: CARLNAES, W.; RISSE, T.; SIMMONS, B.A. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, 2002, p. 540.

[11] REMKES, J. W. Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Dutch House of Representatives, dated 6 November 2006, offer of evaluation of action programme “Quality Enforcement”. Available at: http://www.justitie.nl/images/evaluatie%20Handhaven%20op%20Niveau_6534_tcm34-25550.pdf

[12] ROBINSON, Paul H.; DARLEY, John M. Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, v. 42, n. 2.

[13] SANDERSON, Catherine A.; DARLEY, John M. Darley. I Am Moral, but You Are Deterred: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law. Journal of Applied Psychology, 2002, v. 32, n. 2, p. 375-405.

[14] SCHOLZ, J. Deterrence, cooperation and the ecology of regulatory enforcement. Law and Society Review. Utah: Wiley, 1984, v. 18, n. 2, p. 179-224.

[15] STURMAN, Henry. Zwaarder straffen werkt. Elsevier, 17 January 2003. Available at: http://www.henrysturman.com/dutch/artikelen/straffen.html

[16] TALLBERG, Jonas. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union. International Organization. Massachusetts, v. 56, p. 609-643, 2002

[17] TYLER, Tom R. Why do People Obey the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

[18] VAN VELTHOVEN, B. C.J. Economie van misdaad en straf (The Economy of Crime and Punishment). Boom Lemma Publishers, 2012.

[19] VERSLUIS, Esther. Compliance Problems in the EU: What potential role for agencies in securing compliance, Paper prepared for the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest 2005. Available at: http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/eversluis.pdf Visited on 4 Feb. 2013.

[20] WITTBERG, Lennart. Can Communication Activities Improve Compliance? In: ELFFERS, H.; VERBOON, P.; HUISMAN, W. (ed.). Managing and Maintaining Compliance. Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague 2006, p. 25-43.