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Autores Convidados

v. 21 n. 125 (2020)

Direitos sociais e a falácia do nirvana

DOI
https://doi.org/10.20499/2236-3645.RJP2019v21e124-2018
Enviado
21 agosto 2019
Publicado
30-01-2020

Resumo

Parte importante da literatura jurídica defende a proteção judicial de direitos sociais com base em três argumentos. Primeiro, tanto os direitos sociais quanto os direitos civis têm custos e sua proteção judicial pode demandar prestações positivas dispendiosas. Segundo, a maior capacidade institucional e legitimidade democrática do Legislativo ou da Administração para lidar com questões de alocação de recursos é exagerada. Terceiro, o Judiciário pode ser reformado para se tornar mais inclusivo e informado e, assim, promover deliberação e participação em políticas sociais. Este artigo analisa estes três argumentos e conclui que eles criam uma “falácia do nirvana” ao contrapor, de um lado, uma caracterização distópica da Administração Pública e do processo democrático e, de outro, uma descrição idealizada da natureza do Judiciário e de suas potencialidades.

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